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Upon dissolution of a marriage, the inheritance law of most states dictates division
of the property based on a theory that only the assets of the marriage will be divided.
Upon death of a spouse, while community property states espouse such a theory, com-
mon law forced share states do not. This Article explores the propriety of the forced
share system in light of society's present attitudes toward marriage. The author con-
cludes that the common law system should be amended to reflect aspects of the com-
munity property system.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades a consensus has evolved in commu-
nity law' and common property2 states regarding the economic con-
sequences of divorce. In most states, a divorce court can divide
property accumulated by either spouse during marriage, if the prop-
erty was acquired due to the spouse's effort.3 Premarital acquisi-
tions, and acquisitions by one spouse during marriage due to gifts or
inheritances, cannot be so divided.4 This reflects the "marital part-
* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. This Article incorporates
helpful comments made by my colleagues Gil Finnell and Joe Sanders. The author is in-
debted to Juanita Alt for her tireless secretarial help. Rosa Silbert's research assistance also
has been quite valuable. Barbara Foley Wilson, of the National Center for Health Statistics,
kindly helped the author locate relevant statistical information.
1. Forty-two states adopted marital property rules similar to those of England. These
states are referred to as "common law" states. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATES §§ 7.1-7.2 (1968); Comment, The Development of Shar-
ing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1269, 1272-76,
1280-84 (1981).
2. Eight states accepted the marital property system developed by France and Spain.
These states are referred to as "community property" states. See W. DEFUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1 (2d ed. 1971); Comment, supra note
1, at 1269, 1276-78.
3. See generally Comment, supra note 1 (discussing the distinctions between the com-
mon law and community property systems and highlighting the emerging incorporation of
the sharing principle of the community property system into the common law system).
4. See generally Foster & Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York Partnership of
Co-Equals?, 8 FAm. L.Q. 169 (1974) (asserting the inequities of the common law system,
where only jointly held property is distributed or made subject to partition in the case of
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nership" theory of marriage-that spouses should only share the
fruits of the efforts expended by the spouses during the marriage.'
However, no such consensus exists regarding the rights of a sur-
viving spouse when a marriage is dissolved by the death of a spouse.
In community property states, the survivor receives one-half of the
marital partnership property; the decedent can devise the remaining
one-half, plus all other property owned by the decedent.'
In common law states, the survivor has the right to receive a
specified portion of the decedent's total estate, rather than a portion
of marital partnership property. This right of the survivor is re-
ferred to as the "forced share" or the "elective share." 7
The forced share system, as it currently exists in most states, is
divorce); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and
Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974) (proposing a family partnership
model to accord equality of rights to both spouses and as an alternative base for determing
rights and duties; as opposed to the present common law system, which the authors believe to
be the most sex discriminatory in the law); Krauskopf, A Theoryfor "Just" Division ofMari-
tal Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV. 165 (1976) (the shared enterprise theory was applied
only to property acquired during the marriage, through efforts of the spouses; the power to
divide property was not extended to separate property).
5. Foster & Freed, supra note 4, at 188-94; Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 4, at 586-
91; Krauskopf, supra note 4, at 165-67.
6. See generally W. REPPY & C. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES 309-32 (2d ed. 1982) (all community property states allow the decedent spouse to
dispose, by will, of half of the community property, in addition to his separate property).
7. See generally Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 144-49
(1936) (limitations upon free testation, widow may elect to take a compulsory share under
applicable statute, in lieu of will provision; the widow's share includes real property held by
decedent and has been extended to decedent's personal property in some jurisdictions); Chaf-
flin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: The Surviving Spouse's Year's Support
and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REV. 447, 458-59 (1976) (statutory provisions protect
wife from disinheritance; at common law, an inchoate interest exists in the property of the
husband and cannot be defeated by will; currently, an elective share has evolved in most
states allowing the spouse to take a statutory amount rather than that provided for in the
will); Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037, 1058-64
(1966) (the first tentative draft of Revised Part II, Model Probate Code, allows a widow to
elect a statutory share rather than the amount provided in the will, the elective share is taken
from the augmented net estate); Kulzer, Property and the Family: Spousal Protection, 4
RUT.-CAM. L. J. 195 (1973) (the forced share theory contemplates that the survivor will have
the right to a stated fraction, often the intestate share of the net probate estate (both realty
and personalty) at the death of the property-owning spouse); Kulzer, Law and the Housewife:
Property, Divorce and Death, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 28-41 (1975) (the widow's elective share
is generally the same or less than the intestate share; such share is measured by the "aug-
mented estate," which includes various inter vivos transfers that are not permitted to affect
the spouse's share).
A few common law states do limit a surviving spouse's forced share to marital partnership
acquisitions. See OKLA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 44 (West Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-2-201, 75-2-202 (1978). This will be discussed in connection with infra note 107
and accompanying text.
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difficult to justify. Recent societal changes have undermined
whatever usefulness the system might have had. The purpose of
this Article is to consider possible justifications for the forced share
system and to suggest changes that would better satisfy the relevant
policies involved.
II. HISTORICAL PREDECESSORS OF THE
FORCED SHARE SYSTEM
At common law, a surviving spouse had the right of dower (if a
female) or curtesy (if a male).' This gave the surviving spouse a life
estate in a specified amount of the lands of the decedent. For exam-
ple, a surviving wife received a life estate in one-third of the hus-
band's lands.9 These rights attached not only to land owned by the
decedent at death, but also to land that was conveyed by the dece-
dent during the marriage. 10
While dower and curtesy provided some protection for surviv-
ing spouses, they also had negative effects. For example, dower
constituted a cloud on title to realty and, therefore, a restraint upon
alienation, since it attached to all realty owned by the husband at
any time during the marriage."1
In addition, dower and curtesy did not adequately ensure that
the surviving spouse would share in all property accumulated by the
spouses during marriage. Although dower attached to all realty
owned by the husband during marriage, it did not attach to realty
owned by a corporation controlled by the husband. The controlled
corporation therefore became a popular avoidance technique. Also,
interests in personalty became increasingly important components
of family wealth. Since dower and curtesy did not attach to person-
alty, they were increasingly irrelevant to any attempt to divide equi-
tably the estate of the parties accumulated during the marriage. 12
Even when there was some realty upon which the dower right
could attach, the result was not always satisfactory. After the hus-
8. Chafflin, supra note 7, at 465.
9. Id. at n.39.
10. If the wife joined in the conveyance, however, the dower right was extinguished. Id.
Curtesy attached if an issue of the marriage was born alive. If this occurred, the surviving
husband would have a life estate in all of the wife's realty. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER,
PROPERTY 541 (1981). See also M. SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
EARLY AMERICA 141 (1986).
11. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 10, at 541.
12. Id. See also Clark, The Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the
Spouse's Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. REv. 513,
516 (1970) (discussing inadequacies of wife's right to dower in husband's land).
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band's death, the widow would have to continue to pay taxes and
any purchase-money debt secured by the property. The widow fre-
quently did not have the assets to make such payments. Moreover,
the life estate was not particularly marketable.
III. THE CURRENT SYSTEMS REGARDING THE RIGHTS OF A
SURVIVING SPOUSE
A. Common Law States
Almost all states have abolished dower and curtesy interests. 13
These systems were replaced by an overlay of protective measures.
Many states give the surviving spouse some kind of family allow-
ance.14 This is either a small lump sum payment, a right to live in
the family home or a right to receive maintenance from the dece-
dent's estate while the estate is being administered.15 Also, the sur-
viving spouse is given certain types of personal property, such as the
furnishings of the home. 6
In addition, many common law states give the surviving spouse
the right to obtain a forced share of the decedent's estate.17 Under
this system, the surviving spouse has the right to elect to take one-
13. See Volkmer, Spousal Property Rights at Death: Reevalution of the Common Law
Premises in Light of the Proposed Uniform Marital Property Act, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 95,
100 (1983); J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 10, at 541.
14. See, eg., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-403 (1982).
15. Id. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2403 (1975 & Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 53-5-2 (1982 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-403 (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 700.287 (1980 & Supp. 1987). See, e.g., Fenn & Koren, The 1974 Florida Probate Code -
A Marriage of Convenience, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1974); Fratcher, supra note 7, at 1041-
42; Chafflin, supra note 7, at 475-76.
In many states, the family allowance cannot be paid for a period exceeding one year. In
some states, the allowance can be paid for the entire period the estate is being administered.
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 314 (1965). No maximum duration appears to apply in a few
states, as long as the estate is solvent. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2403 (1975 & Supp.
1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-2 (1982 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-403 (1979);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.287 (1980 & Supp. 1987). Wisconsin has clearly established a
system that permits support for a surviving spouse for an indefinite period from the estate of
the decedent. The payments can continue beyond the period the estate is being administered.
See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 861.31, 861.35 (1971 & Supp. 1987).
16. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-402; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2402 (1975 &
Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-402 (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.286 (1980 & Supp.
1987). See generally J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 391-95 (3d ed.
1984).
17. See generally Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate
Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981, 990-92 (1977) (dis-
cussing the pros and cons of various forced share systems); Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable
Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 passim (1966) (using
statistics to argue that the problem of disinhertiance occurs relatively rarely); Volkmer, supra
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third or one-half of the decedent's estate, depending upon the state's
law. The election fraction applicable in a state sometimes varies,
depending upon whether the decedent is also survived by children. 18
In many states these forced share rights initially were limited to
property in the decedent's estate. This did not accomplish the de-
sired result, however, since it was quite easy for decedents who de-
sired to disinherit the surviving spouse to circumvent the system by
various means, such as by conveying their property before death, by
establishing an inter vivos trust, or by establishing joint tenancies
with a third party. So, it was quite possible that there would be
little property in the decedent's estate, even if the decedent accumu-
lated a significant amount of property during the marriage. Thus,
the forced share initially did little to assure that the surviving
spouse would be protected.19
Attempts were made to broaden the forced share to include
more of the actual family wealth. The Uniform Probate Code gives
the surviving spouse the right to obtain a forced share of the dece-
dent's "augmented estate."2 The augmented estate includes more
than the property in the decedent's estate. It includes gifts to any
donee totaling more than $3000 that are made by the decedent
within two years of the date of death,2" as well as other inter vivos
transfers made during marriage over which the decedent retained
substantial control.22 By these measures, the drafters attempted to
note 13. Georgia does not give a surviving spouse a forced share. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 53-
2-9 (1982); Comment, 19 GA. L. REv. 427 (1985).
For a comparative law discussion regarding the provisions of other systems for a surviv-
ing spouse, see M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, Interspousal Relations, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 4, at 122 (France), 195 (Islamic law).
18. See Clark, supra note 12, at 533-34. For an example of the Model Probate Code's
treatment of this, see Fratcher, supra note 7, at 1058-59.
19. See Kulzer, Property and the Family, supra note 7.
20. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(I)(i)-(iv) (1982).
21. Id. This restriction does not apply if the transfers were made with the consent of the
surviving spouse. Id.
22. See Clark, supra note 12, at 537 ("augmented estate... includes various transfers
with testamentary characteristics"); Falender, Protective Provisions for Surviving Spouses in
Indiana. Considerations for a Legislative Response to Leazenby, 11 IND. L. REv. 755, 778
(1978) (Augmented estate consists of decedents net estate "increased by the value of two
categories of gratuitous transfers-transfers to third parties and transfers to the spouse.");
Spouse's Elective Share, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 323, 328 (1977) (Report of the Com-
mittee on Administration and Distribution of Decedent's Estates) (Augmented estate is "the
net probate estate plus the value of certain property transfered at any time to any person
other than the surviving spouse, to the extent that full and adequate consideration has not
been received.").
For cases involving this issue, see, eg., Estate of Fleischmann, 723 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. App.
1987); Estate of Gray, 729 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. App. 1987).
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give the surviving spouse the right to have a forced share regarding
an estate that more closely approximated the actual estate accumu-
lated by the decedent.
The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code concluded that the
surviving spouse's forced share rights should be offset against any
property transferred to the surviving spouse by the decedent by will
or during the marriage, as well as any life insurance, joint tenancy
holdings, or pension rights that the spouse will receive after the de-
cedent's death. So, the UPC forced share amount is offset against
all such transfers from the decedent to the widow.23
The various state forced share systems are not uniform. There-
fore, it is difficult to generalize about their provisions. Many states
have amended their forced share statutes to make it more difficult to
disinherit the surviving spouse. Some have adopted the UPC aug-
mented estate concept.2 4 Almost all common law states give the
survivor a forced share of the decedent's estate, and some effort is
made to return to the decedent's estate transfers made before death
in fraud of the surviving spouse's rights.2 5
B. Community Property States
In community property states, a surviving spouse normally re-
ceives the furnishings of the home and certain other "exempt prop-
erty,"2 6 as well as transitional support from the decedent's estate.27
In addition, the survivor is entitled to one-half of the "community
estate,"2 8 which is all property accumulated by either spouse during
the marriage, except for that property acquired by gratuitous
transfer.29
23. See supra note 22. The UPC forced share applies regardless of whether the husband
or wife dies first. From a policy standpoint, however, the former situation is more important
and will be the focus of this paper.
24. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 3B, § 1 (West 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.17 (West
1971 & Supp. 1987).
25. For example, for purposes of the forced share computation a number of states will
include in the decedent's estate any property transferred by the decedent that is considered an
illusory transfer. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973);
Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
26. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6510 (West 1956); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 271
(Vernon 1980).
27. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540 (West 1956); Tax. PROB. CODE ANN. § 287
(Vernon 1980).
28. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 100 (West 1956 & Supp. 1988); W. DEFUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, supra note 2, at §§ 69, 202.
29. The term "gratuitous transfer" is used to refer to an acquisition by a spouse from a
third party, if the property is received by gift, inheritance, devise or bequest.
[Vol. 38:223
SURVIVING SPOUSE'S FORCED SHARE
In contrast to common law systems, in community property
states each spouse has a vested, fifty percent ownership interest in
all community property from the moment that the property is ac-
quired by a spouse.3" Significant limitations, therefore, normally
are imposed upon the ability of one spouse to give community prop-
erty to a third party without the other spouse's consent.3 1
If a homemaker spouse predeceases a wage earner spouse in a
community property state, the homemaker can devise one-half of
the community estate.32
IV. IS THE CURRENT FORCED SHARE SYSTEM ADEQUATE?
In order to analyze the adequacy of the forced share system, the
goals of the system must be determined. The forced share system
attempts to ensure the support of dependent surviving spouses. In
addition, it may, to a limited extent, also recognize the partnership
aspect of marriage. In other words, even though property accumu-
lated during marriage by one spouse in a common law state is con-
sidered "owned" by that spouse during marriage, society considers
it fair to give the other spouse a share of the fruits of the partnership
when the marriage ends. For the below stated reasons the forced
share system accomplishes neither of these goals well.
A. The Support Function
Under current forced share systems, the surviving spouse is
given the right to obtain one-third to one-half of the decedent's es-
tate.33 To the extent that this system provides the surviving spouse
with reasonable support, this result is fortuitous. For example, if
the decedent's estate is small, one-third of the small estate will not
provide adequate support for the surviving spouse if the surviving
spouse has little other property and no earning capacity. However,
if the estate is large, or if the surviving spouse has significant prop-
erty or a decent earning capacity, one-third could be too much.
A random sampling of decedent's estates in the 1960's found
that most estates at that time amounted to between $2,000 and
$60,000." 4 Even if these numbers are adjusted for inflation, it seems
30. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, at § 105.
31. Id. at 233-41.
32. Id. at 309-19. See, eg., CAL. PROB. CODE § 100 (West Supp. 1987).
33. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
34. See M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMIH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 173-75
(1970).
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clear that one-third of this amount alone will not guarantee ade-
quate support for life for the survivor.
Even though the specified fractional share is not well-tailored to
provide support for a surviving spouse, it could be argued that it
works a fair compromise between testamentary freedom and the
needs of the surviving spouse. The testator is permitted to devise
some property, while another portion of the estate is subject to the
support obligation toward the surviving spouse. Still, this dodges a
basic issue presented by the forced share question. Should the dece-
dent have a continuing obligation to support the surviving spouse?
The forced share system attempts to answer this question, yet re-
sults in a compromise that both disrupts testamentary freedom and
fails to ensure adequate support for the spouse.
Another flaw of the forced share system is the absence of any
consideration of the assets and earning capacity of the surviving
spouse. It would seem reasonable to interfere with the decedent's
testamentary freedom only when a compelling policy concern is
present. However, under current forced share systems, a surviving
spouse is always entitled to a portion of the decedent's estate, re-
gardless of whether the surviving spouse would otherwise suffer.
As a result, the forced share system is an ineffective way to en-
sure that a surviving spouse receives adequate support after the
death of the decedent. Under this system, many surviving spouses
receive insufficient support, while others are given a right to a
forced share even though they are already self-sufficient. The sup-
port function could be better satisfied by other systems. For exam-
ple, the English system allows a dependent spouse to obtain a
reasonable allowance (not limited to one-third or one-half) from the
decedent's estate, if the spouse would not otherwise be able to sup-
port herself.35
The English system could create problems, however. Although
35. Crane, Family Provision on Death in English Law, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 985, 992
(1960). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.35 (West Supp. 1987) (permiting reasonable allow-
ance); W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960) (a critical analysis of the
American system and advocating adoption of the British system); Laufer, Flexible Restraints
on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance Legislation, 69
HARV. L. REV. 277 (1955) (comparing various common law systems); Naresh, Dependants'
Applications Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, 96 L.Q.
REV. 534 (1980); Note, Family Maintenance: An Inheritance Schemefor the Living, 8 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 673 (1977) (a comparative analysis of the British and American systems). Under
current English law, the probate court can also make a reasonable award of property to the
surviving spouse, in addition to the support award. See Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion
in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1164, 1187 (1986).
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this system seems to work well in England,3 6 some have been con-
cerned that American surviving spouses would frequently litigate to
determine whether they had adequate resources to provide for their
support, and what would constitute a "reasonable" support award
from the estate. Also, this system probably would complicate the
administration of many decedents' estates. If the estate had an obli-
gation to support a surviving spouse for life, a significant reserve
would have to be maintained; it would not be clear what property
could be transferred from the estate to a devisee.
The English family maintenance system clearly gives the surviv-
ing spouse claim to all the assets of the estate, if necessary.37 This
system has accepted the idea that the primary obligation of the de-
cedent is the satisfaction of family support obligations. If this prior-
ity is not accepted, the English system would have to be modified.
B. The Marital Partnership Function
The forced share gives a surviving spouse the right to claim a
portion of the decedent's estate. It could therefore be considered a
delayed mechanism for allowing the surviving spouse to share in the
accumulation of property during the marriage.38 However, this
purpose is imperfectly attained.
Many commentators have remarked upon the partnership na-
ture of contemporary marriage.39 One spouse may help the other
achieve success in his or her career. Also, if the spouses have chil-
dren one spouse frequently assumes responsibility for childcare,
while the other works for wages outside the home. Because of this,
many have concluded that, at least at divorce, spouses should share
property accumulated during marriage." In most states, if a mar-
riage is dissolved by divorce spouses do not share all property accu-
mulated during marriage; property acquired during marriage by
one spouse by gratuitous transfer is not considered a marital asset. 1
36. See R. OUGHTON, TYLER'S FAMILY PROVISION 19, 30 (2d ed. 1984); Note, British
Inheritance Legislation: Discretionary Distribution at Death, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
205 (1985).
37. See R. OUGHTON, supra note 36, at 109, 230 (noting court has discretion to ensure
the applicant will be adequately maintained).
38. See Rheinstein, Book Reyiew, 59 MICH. L. REv. 806 (1961).
39. See, eg., K. GRAY, REALLOCATION OF PROPERTY ON DIVORCE (1977); Cantwell,
Man + Woman + Property = ?, 6 THE PROB. LAW. 1 (1980); Foster & Freed, supra note 4;
Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 4; Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital
Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1977).
40. See Oldham, Is the Concept of Marital Property Outdated?, 22 J. FAM. L. 263, 265
n.4, 266-67 (1983-84).
41. Id. at 263-64 nn. 1-2.
1987]
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Because no effort is necessary to acquire a gift or an inheritance,
such acquisitions are not considered true partnership acquisitions.42
For similar reasons, acquisitions before marriage are not shared.
The forced share system achieves a result quite different from
the division of marital property at divorce. For example, all prop-
erty of the decedent is included in the augmented estate; it is irrele-
vant under forced share systems whether property was acquired
before or after marriage, or whether the property was derived from
the decedent's wages or from a gratuitous transfer. Also, the
amount of property accumulated by the surviving spouse during
marriage, other than via gifts from the decedent, is irrelevant. A
wealthy spouse surviving a marriage that endured for two months
has the same forced share rights as a poor spouse surviving a mar-
riage that endured for fifty years.43
Viewed from the perspective of a woman surviving a "tradi-
tional marriage"'  of long duration, the forced share system seems
to punish the woman for not divorcing. In most marriages of long
duration, all of the spouses' property is marital partnership prop-
erty. At divorce, she could receive one-half (or more) of the marital
property, plus alimony. In contrast, if the marriage continues until
the wage earner dies, if the wage earner devises his estate to a third
party, in most states the woman receives one-third of the marital
property and no alimony (other than transitional support).45
Another aspect of the forced share system undermines any part-
nership goal. In a "traditional family," where one spouse works
outside the home and the other is responsible for household func-
tions, if the financially dependent spouse dies first, that spouse can-
not devise marital partnership property unless some property has
been put in the name of the dependent spouse during marriage.
42. See Cantwell, Drafting the Uniform Marital Property Act: The Issues and Debate, 21
Hous. L. REv. 669 (1984).
43. But see, e.g., OKLA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 44 (West Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-2-201, 75-2-202 (1978).
A few states do not grant a surviving spouse a forced share of a spouse's estate if the
surviving spouse has significant assets. For example, some states bar a forced share claim if
the surviving spouse has net assets of a value at least equal to the amount of the enumerated
forced share. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-29 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 3B, § 8-18
(1983). Alabama does not permit a forced share if the value of the survivor's estate exceeds
the value of the decedent's. See 22 ALA. CODE § 43-8-70 (1982).
44. The term "traditional marriage" is used to refer to those relationships in which one
spouse did not work outside the home during the marriage.
45. The English Law Commission has concluded that the claim of a surviving spouse to
marital assets should be at least equal to that of a divorcing spouse. See R. OUGHTON, supra
note 36, at 26 nn. 61-62 and accompanying text.
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This characteristic of the forced share system suggests that its pri-
mary concern is providing support for a potentially dependent sur-
viving spouse, not fulfilling a marital partnership concept.
The marital partnership concept is not well served by current
forced share systems. The marital partnership concept would best
be advanced by the adoption of the Uniform Marital Property
Act.46 This act basically adopts the community property concept of
marital property rights. Each spouse acquires a vested interest dur-
ing marriage in the earnings of the other spouse received during
marriage. So, if the dependent spouse survives the wage-earning
spouse, the surviving spouse would receive one-half of the fruits of
the partnership. Conversely, if the dependent spouse dies first, she
could devise one-half of the marital estate. However, it is unclear
whether many common law states will be willing to accept this new
marital property rights system.47
V. QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CURRENT FORCED
SHARE SYSTEM
A. Infrequency of Remarriage
The forced share system appears to be a relic of another age.
First, the share applies to all property owned by the decedent. This
system must assume that all decedents have been married for a long
period, that most marriages are dissolved by death, not divorce, and
that people marry only once. These assumptions are now quite
inaccurate.
During the last few decades, the divorce rate has significantly
increased.48 Many marriages, particularly those of senior citizens,
are remarriages for one or both parties.49 In such a marriage, the
46. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT, 9A U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 1984). For a general discussion
concerning the issues and debates on this act, see Cantwell, supra note 42.
47. Wisconsin is the only common law state to date that has adopted a system similar to
the U.M.P.A. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001-766.97 (West 1987).
48. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERV., PUB. No. (PHS) 86-1120, ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL DIVORCE STATISTICS, 1984
(published in Monthly Vital Statistics Report Vol. 35, No. 6 Supp., Sept. 25, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter 1984 ADVANCE REPORT]; W. KEPHART, THE FAMILY, SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
481 (5th ed. 1981); Spanier & Glick, Marital Instability in the United States: Some Correlates
and Recent Changes, 30 FAM. REL. 329 (1981).
49. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERV., PUB. No. (PHS) 86-1120, ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL MARRIAGE STATISTICS,
1983 (published in Monthly Vital Statistics Report Vol. 35, No. 1 Supp., at 3, May 2, 1986)
[hereinafter 1983 ADVANCE REPORT]. Only 55% of all current marriages are the first mar-
riage for both parties. Id. See generally A. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE
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spouse could die quite soon after the wedding."
B. Dependency of the Surviving Spouse
The forced share system is primarily tailored to protect the
widow. 1 Most systems ignore the amount of property owned by
the widow when the decedent dies, as well as the widow's earning
capacity.52 The system therefore must assume that all widows have
no property or earning capacity.
Married women are entering the work force in increasing num-
bers.53 Some have a significant earning capacity. For example, a
recent study found that six million women earned more than their
husbands.5 4 Also, particularly because women live longer55 the
widow might have received property in connection with the dissolu-
tion of a prior marriage. A significant number of widows own a
substantial amount of property or have an earning capacity when
the decedent dies. This is ignored by the forced share system. 6
(1981). The rate of remarriage for older women has historically been low. Cherlin, Women
and the Family, in THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1987-88, at 76-77 (S. Rix. ed. 1987).
50. See, e.g., Merrill v. Estate of Merrill, 275 Or. 653, 552 P.2d 249 (1976) (just over two
months); Estate of Friedman, 483 Pa. 614, 398 A.2d 615 (1978) (11 days).
51. All systems apply to both widows and widowers. Even so, due to the longer life
expectancy of women, as well as the lower average earnings of women, the primary public
policy concern is the welfare of widows.
For example, about twice as many husbands predecease their wives, as compared to wives
predeceasing their husbands. See Schoen, Urton, Woodrow & Baj, Marriage and Divorce in
Twentieth Century American Cohorts, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 101 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter Mar-
riage and Divorce]. Also, the average duration of widowhood is about twice as long for fe-
males, compared to males. Id. at 112. The remarriage rate for widows is about one-half that
for widowers. Id. See also 1983 ADVANCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 3.
52. See, e.g., Flagship Nat'l Bank of Miami v. King, 418 So.2d 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (where a widow with a net worth of $1,500,000 sued to obtain her forced share); cf
supra note 43.
53. It has been estimated that two-thirds of all women will be in the labor force by 1995.
See Shellenbarger, Societal Shift: As More Women Take Jobs, They Affect Ads, Politics, Fam-
ily Life, Wall St. J., June 29, 1982, at 1, col. 1. A recent census study found that of the 40.9
million married couples in which the husband was employed, 26.2 million (64%) of the wives
also worked. See Hacker, Where Have the Jobs Gone?, N.Y. Rev. of Books, June 30, 1983, at
29, col. 1.
At the present time, younger married women seem more inclined to work than older
married women. For example, 18% of married women aged 20-24 do not work, 26% age 24-
35 do not work, 27% age 35-44 do not work, and 33% age 45-54 do not work. See Robey,
Hit or Myth? Demographic Trends Aren't Always What They Seem, Barron's, Feb. 13, 1984,
at 22, 24. This suggests that, as the younger women age, a decreasing number of widows will
have no earning capacity.
54. See 6 Million Women Earn More Than Spouses, Study Says, Dallas Times Herald,
Jan. 16, 1984, at A4, col. 1 (referring to the study by Bianchi & Spain of the Census Bureau).
55. See Marriage and Divorce, supra note 51.
56. A number of forced share cases involve widows with significant assets. See, e.g.,
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C. Both Spouses Have Identical Testamentary Intentions
Under the forced share system, if a financially dependent spouse
dies first the financially dependent spouse has no right to devise
property accumulated by the other spouse during marriage. This
assumes either that the acquiring spouse will devise the property in
a manner consistent with the other spouse's wishes, or it may as-
sume that the financially dependent spouse has no legitimate claim
to accumulations during marriage. These assumptions certainly
could be challenged.
D. A Post-Death Spousal Support Obligation Should Always Exist
One recent case involved a situation where two people met in
August 1973 and married in November 1973.17 Both had been
married before, and had raised children. The man died about two
months after the wedding. The widow sued to obtain her forced
share right. Under current law, she clearly possessed such a right
(regardless of the length of the marriage), unless she waived it.5 8
The case involved the validity of the purported waiver.
Estate of Neiderhiser59 presented an even more extreme case.
Mr. Neiderhiser collapsed and died during the marriage ceremony.
Before Mr. Neiderhiser died, he and the bride had agreed to be man
and wife, and he had placed a ring on her finger. The man died
while the minister was saying a prayer. When the man collapsed,
the minister stopped the ceremony and pronounced the bride and
groom man and wife. This was considered a valid marriage, enti-
tling the widow to a forced share.
To the extent that the forced share system is intended to provide
support for the surviving spouse after death of the decedent, it as-
Flagship Nat'l Bank of Miami v. King, 418 So. 2d 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Merrill v.
Estate of Merrill, 275 Or. 653, 552 P.2d 249 (1976); Estate of Friedman, 483 Pa. 614, 398
A.2d 615 (1978).
However, I do not mean to suggest that no widows experience poverty. See, e.g.,
Burkhasuer, Holden & Myers, Marital Disruption and Poverty: the Role of Survey Procedures
in Artificially Creating Poverty, 23 DEMOGRAPHY 621 (1986); Cherlin, Women and the Fam-
ily, in THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1987-88, at 96-97 (S. Rix ed. 1987); Holden, Burkhauser &
Myers, Income Transitions at Older Stages of Life: The Dynamics of Poverty, 26 THE GERON-
TOLOGIsT 292, 292-308 (June 1986) [hereinafter Income Transitions]; Smith & Zick, The Inci-
dence of Poverty Among Recently Widowed: Mediating Factors in the Life Course, 48 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 619 (1986); Old, Alone and Poor (Report of the Commonwealth Fund
Commission on Elderly People Living Alone 1987).
57. See Merrill v. Estate of Merrill, 275 Or. 653, 552 P.2d 249 (1976).
58. For a similar case, see Hoffman v. Kohns, 385 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
59. 59 Westmoreland County L. J. 60, 2 Pa. D. & C. 3d 302 (1977).
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sumes that a post-death support obligation should stem from all
marriages. This assumption deserves serious reconsideration.
Marriage traditionally was considered a lifetime bond dissolved
only by the death of a spouse. Divorce was quite difficult to ob-
tain,6" the childless marriage was almost unknown, and most
couples raised children.6 The traditional marriage generally was a
lifetime partnership and was "childful," and middle class married
women rarely worked.62
Recent social changes have dramatically affected the institution
of marriage. Divorce at will has been accepted by most states.63
Indeed, it has been estimated that more marriages now being cele-
brated will be dissolved by divorce than by death. 4 Childless mar-
riages are increasingly common. 5 Marriage is increasingly viewed
as a partnership terminable at will, rather than a lifetime partner-
ship.66 Also, many more married women work outside the home.67
How should these societal changes affect the rights of a surviv-
ing spouse? It is useful to compare the manner in which the rights
of divorcing spouses have been affected by these winds of change.
In the past, if spouses divorced and the husband had a sufficient
income, an obligation was imposed upon him to provide support for
his former wife until she died or remarried, or until he died.68 This
was a reasonable remedy in an age when marriages were perceived
as lifetime partnerships, most marriages were "childful," and mid-
dle class married women rarely worked outside the home.
However, a consensus has now been reached that a lifetime post-
divorce support obligation is not always warranted.69 Marriage is
no longer always viewed as a lifetime commitment. Serial monog-
amy is increasingly common.7 ° Women now are assumed to be able
60. See generally W. KEPHART, THE FAMILY, SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 460-63
(1981); 3 G. HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 3-160 (1904).
61. See C. DEGLER, At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to
the Present (1980).
62. Id. at 391, 416.
63. See W. KEPHART, supra note 60, at 463.
64. See J. WEED, NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION AND SURVIVOR-
SHIP, DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES PUB. No. 81-1403, at 3 (Nov. 1980); Mar-
riage and Divorce, supra note 51, at 104-05, 108.
65. See Conant, Three's a Crowd, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1986, at 68.
66. See Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 441, 444, 450-51 (1976).
67. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
68. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 420 (outlining a general history of the
concept of alimony).
69. See M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 60 (1981).
70. See Marriage and Divorce, supra note 51, at I11.
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to work outside the home. When determining whether to award
post-divorce support, courts increasingly focus upon whether the
wife's earning capacity has been undermined by the marriage. The
marriage might have been quite short, or the marriage might have
been childless. In either instance, the earning capacity of the wife
would not have been significantly undermined due to the mar-
riage.71 Such marriages are increasingly viewed as partnerships of
an indefinite term rather than as a lifetime partnership. When dis-
solved by divorce, the parties merely divide the fruits of the mar-
riage, and no post-divorce support obligation normally is imposed.72
A post-divorce support obligation more frequently is imposed in
connection with the dissolution of a marriage of long duration in
which the parties raised children. This type of marriage resembles
the "traditional marriage" of prior eras: it appears to be a lifetime
partnership. Also, the female's earning capacity-normally has been
significantly reduced due to childcare responsibilities. 73 The post-
divorce support obligation imposed after the dissolution of a life-
time partnership traditionally continues until the recipient dies or
remarries, or until the payor dies.74
71. See generally Oldham, supra note 39, at 268 (arguing that the equitable distribution
of property should not automatically apply to all marriages). Some would argue that, if the
spouses had one or more children, the earning capacity of the primary caretaker will thereby
be significantly affected, even if the marriage did not last a significant period. See J. EEKE-
LARR & M. MACLEAN, MAINTENANCE AFTER DIVORCE (1986); Glendon, Family Law Re-
form in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REv. 1553 (1984). Cf Deech, Financial Relief- The Retreat
from Precedent and Principle, 98 L.Q. REV. 621 (1982).
72. See Glendon, Modern Marriage Law and Its Underlying Assumptions: The New
Marriage and the New Property, 13 FAM. L.Q. 441, 449-451 (1980) (perishability of modem
marriages has led to breakdown of support laws); Deech, supra note 71, at 655 (short-term
rehabilitative alimony may be granted if claimant can justify it).
73. See generally J. EEKELAAR & M. MACLEAN, supra note 71.
74. At common law, the only common type of "divorce" was a divorce a mensa et thoro.
This was a divorce from bed and board, not an absolute divorce. A continuing support obli-
gation was conceptually appropriate, since the marriage was not dissolved. This support
obligation ended when the marriage was dissolved by the death of either spouse. For a fuller
discussion of common law divorce, see Comment, Continuance of Alimony and Payments for
Support of Minor Children After a Husband's Death, 35 VA. L. REV. 482 (1949); Vernier &
Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1939).
Even though American states accepted absolute divorce, post-divorce alimony was also
accepted. Some state alimony statutes expressly state that an alimony award cannot continue
beyond the death of the payor, unless the payor consents. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West
1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (1983). See, eg., Estate of Kuhns v. Kuhns, 550 P.2d 816
(Alaska 1976); Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Some states do
permit a divorce court to bind the payor's estate, if the court chooses to do so. See Roberts v.
Roberts, 257 Iowa 1, 131 N.W.2d 458 (1964); Surabian v. Surabian, 362 Mass. 342, 285
N.E.2d 909 (1972); Stoutland v. Stoutland's Estate, 103 N.W.2d 286 (N.D. 1960); Edwards
v. Edwards, 713 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn. 1986); DeRiemer v. Old Nat'l Bank of Spokane, 60
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A husband no longer automatically has an obligation after di-
vorce to support the wife until she dies or remarries. A lifetime
support obligation is imposed only if the marriage was of long dura-
tion and the parties raised a child. Also, the obligation normally
ends when the payor dies, even if the recipient still needs support.
Given this system for support after divorce, what would make
sense for post-death support? Most state probate systems currently
provide for short-term transitional support for the surviving spouse
while the estate is being administered. This is analogous to the
short-term rehabilitative alimony sometimes awarded in divorces
involving marriages of relatively short duration.75 When, if ever,
should support for a longer period be possible?
In order to make this decision, it is useful to clarify the situa-
tions where the decedent excludes the surviving spouse from most
or all of his estate. Almost all such occurrences involve marriages
later in life of adults who have been previously married to others,
and who have raised a family with others.76 These later marriages
frequently are childless. When a spouse dies after such a marriage
late in life, the spouse frequently devises most or all of his property
to his children. Seen from this perspective, the policy concerns
presented by the post-death support obligation issue become clear.
When should property (other than 50 percent of the marital part-
Wash. 2d 686, 374 P.2d 973 (1962); Prather v. Prather, 305 S.E.2d 304 (W.Va. 1983); Com-
ment, supra. Even in these states, however, an alimony obligation rarely extends beyond the
payor's death. See generally Annotation, 39 A.L.R.2D 1406; 24 AM. JUR. 2D, Divorce and
Separation, § 676 (1983); H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 461-63. If the alimony obligation con-
tinues beyond the payor's death, this would complicate the probate of the payor's estate and
possibly make it impossible to carry out the terms of the decedent's will. One commentator
has suggested that this explains why alimony rarely binds the payor's estate. Id.
If the payor consents, however, the alimony obligation can bind the payor's estate. In re
Estate of Sweeney, 210 Kan. 216, 500 P.2d 56 (1972) (support payments for a child do not
bind an estate unless there is express language which gives evidence of the intentions of the
parties); White v. White, 48 Ohio App. 2d 72, 355 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio App. 1975) (if a hus-
band, by written separation agreement, contracts to support the wife as long as she lives, this
obligation continues after the husband dies). Also, courts sometimes effect a property divi-
sion via "lump-sum alimony." This type of "alimony" is treated as if it were a property
division, and does bind the payor's estate. See Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1974) (if the court does not designate part of periodic alimony payments as support,
then the award of permanent alimony is not terminable upon death of the husband).
75. See generally Comment, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need of a More Compre-
hensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 493, 499 (1978) (If the
length of marriage measures the time period during which the spouse has been absent from
the work force and therefore the difficulty she will have in re-entering it, then the support is a
type of insurance for the employment benefits the wife has missed while being a homemaker).
76. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gray, 729 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Finley v.
Finley, 726 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
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nership property) that the decedent wishes to leave to his children
be diverted to the surviving spouse? A long-term post-death sup-
port obligation should be imposed, at most, only in those instances
when the marriage was a lifetime partnership." In all other in-
stances, the transitional support provided by current law while the
decedent's estate is being administered, plus the amended forced
share system suggested below, should be more than fair to the
survivor.
Arguably the state has an interest in reducing the number of
surviving spouses who will become wards of the state. Still, there
should be a better justification for an obligation than that one per-
son has financial need and another has resources sufficient to satisfy
the need. Support obligations should continue beyond the dissolu-
tion of a marriage only when the spouse's financial needs result
from sacrifices made for the marriage. The most common financial
sacrifice would be devoting one's time to childcare responsibilities,
thereby incurring career damage. In contrast, if the surviving
spouse's needs are unrelated to the marriage, it seems quite unfair to
impose a continuing support obligation upon the decedent's
estate.78
If a couple remains married for a significant period, and the
marriage is "childful," such a marriage should be considered a "life-
time partnership" marriage. Some contend that a childless mar-
riage of long duration should also be deemed a lifetime partnership.
In such marriages, the wife could remove herself from the work
77. The concept of "lifetime partnership" will be explored below. The author believes it
is useful to distinguish between marriages of short duration in which neither spouse's earning
capacity was affected by the assumption of family responsibilities, and other marriages. If the
couple has children, a spouse frequently removes herself from the work force to fulfill child
care responsibilities. In such situations, it would be fair to require the decedent to provide
support to such a spouse while she develops an earning capacity.
78. The rights of a surviving spouse in some states reflect this sentiment to some degree.
For example, in some states a spouse surviving a second marriage of the decedent has fewer
rights than one surviving a first marriage. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (1984) (The second
wife is entitled to one-half of the amount provided by the Intestate Succession Act of the
surviving spouse). Other states give a surviving spouse greater rights if the spouse and dece-
dent had a child. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 461 (1974) (Widow is entitled to one-third of
all the real estate, but if there is a child, she is entitled to half in value of such real estate in
fee.); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-1 (1979) (The surviving spouse is entitled to one-third of the
net personal and real estate of the husband; provided that, if the surviving spouse is a second
or subsequent wife who did not have a child with decedent and there is a child from the
husband's previous marriage, then the second childless spouse will take one-third of the net
personal estate plus a life estate in one-third of the land).
If the needs of a surviving spouse are unrelated to the marriage, it is unclear why the
decedent should have a duty to support a surviving spouse, rather than a parent, sibling, or
child.
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force at the husband's request, thereby incurring career damage.
Although there is little information regarding this issue, it appears
that a wife could just as easily remove herself from the work force
because she preferred to do so, rather than surrender her livelihood
solely for her husband's benefit. Even if she did stop working at her
husband's request, in childless marriages the domestic responsibili-
ties assumed would be much less burdensome than those present in
a household with children. In such instances, it seems doubtful that
the spouse was forced to incur career damage due to family respon-
sibilities. Therefore, "lifetime partnership" marriages should be
limited to "childful" marriages that endured for a significant period,
such as seven to ten years. A long-term post-death support obliga-
tion should arise, at most, only if the marriage was a lifetime
partnership.
However, if the notion is accepted that a long-term support obli-
gation should always survive a spouse's death, additional problems
are presented. For example, if a decedent had been married two or
more times, should all spouses, including former spouses, have a
support claim?79 If the support claim is limited to the last lifetime
partner, this problem could easily be avoided. Similarly, if all mar-
riages imposed a post-death support obligation, this could create
undesirable incentives for senior citizens. The loss of significant
governmental benefits or the fear of incurring other burdens if or
when they marry, has encouraged senior citizens to establish un-
married cohabitation relationships instead of getting married. A
mandatory post-death support obligation could have the same effect
upon the remarriage behavior of senior citizens who have significant
assets.8o
One factor justifying post-divorce alimony is not present if a
marriage is dissolved by death. If one spouse has a significant earn-
ing capacity at divorce, the divorce court does not consider this
earning capacity to be divisible property. However, in lifetime part-
nership marriages courts frequently allow the other spouse to share
some of the spouse's post-divorce earnings via alimony. This is con-
sidered fair, because the dependent spouse probably helped the
wage earner develop the earning capacity." Alimony normally
79. England permits this. See R. OUGHTON, supra note 36, at 180.
80. These senior citizens may be reluctant to assume a post-death responsibility to sup-
port the other spouse.
81. See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1181, 1249 n.219 (1981)
("Our interviews indicate that 100% of the respondents in long marriages, both men and
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ends when the wage earner dies, and is a way of allowing the depen-
dent spouse to share the other spouse's post-divorce earnings. If a
marriage is dissolved by death of the wage-earning spouse, there
will be no post-dissolution earnings. The justification for a post-
death support obligation would have to be based on something
other than allowing the spouse to share post-dissolution earnings.
Alimony has been justified as compensation for the lost earning
capacity during marriage suffered by a spouse who assumes primary
responsibility for childcare. If this spouse does not work outside the
home, it has been estimated that her earning capacity decreases
0.582 to 1.5 percent83 per year. Even if this spouse does work
outside the home, she may not be able to maximize her earning
capacity due to her childcare responsibilities. If this justification for
post-dissolution support is accepted, it could be applicable regard-
less of whether a marriage is dissolved by divorce or death.
Post-divorce support obligations normally cease upon the death
of the payor, regardless of whether the recipient has been ade-
quately compensated for any career damage incurred during mar-
riage.84 This suggests that the rationale for post-divorce support is
not compensation for career damage. Still, this does not foreclose
compensation as a rationale for post-dissolution support if a mar-
riage is dissolved by death. In equitable distribution states, divorce
courts can compensate a spouse who has suffered career damage
during marriage with a disproportionate division of the marital es-
tate. In contrast, no state has accepted an equitable distribution
concept regarding marriages dissolved by death. Therefore, there
may be more of a need in this instance to create a remedy for career
damage.
Another factor may distinguish marriages terminated by divorce
and those terminated by death. The remarriage rate of females in-
volved in a divorce is much higher than that of widows.85 This
seems to suggest that widows are more in need of protection than
divorcees. However, the remarriage rate of divorcees older than 64
women, said they believed that their marriage would be a lifelong partnership in which they
would share all the property and income they acquired, and that the wive's efforts to build
their husband's careers (and earning power) were investments both would share." (footnote
omitted)).
82. See Sandell & Shapiro, The Theory of Human Capital and the Earnings of Women:
A Reexamination of the Evidence, 13 J. HUM. RESOURCES 103 (1978).
83. See Mincer & Polachek, Women's Earnings Reexamined, 13 J. HUM. RESOURCES
118 (1978).
84. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 461-62. Cf. supra note 74 (possible exceptions).
85. Marriage and Divorce, supra note 51, at 111.
1987]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
approximates the remarriage rate of widows. 6 The higher remar-
riage rate of divorcees therefore probably is merely a function of the
youth of most divorcees.8 7 Therefore, widows do not need more
protection than divorcees of the same age.
One could argue that a post-death support obligation never
should be imposed, because an alimony obligation after divorce
ceases upon the death of the payor even if the recipient continues to
have a need for support. This policy decision regarding alimony
could be said to reflect the notion that marital support obligations
should terminate at death. Still, there are differences between the
effects of applying this rule to marriages dissolved by death and
those dissolved by divorce, regardless of any continuing need. If a
lifetime partnership marriage is dissolved by divorce, the recipient
normally will receive alimony for a significant period even if the
support obligation stops upon the payor's death. In contrast, if a
lifetime partnership marriage is dissolved by death, the application
of the "no support after the death of the payor" rule would provide
no support to a dependent spouse after dissolution. In addition, if a
marriage is dissolved by divorce, a disproportionate division of
property is possible to provide for the spouse in need. Under cur-
rent systems, if a spouse dies, such a disproportionate division is not
possible.
Federal law provides that surviving spouses normally "inherit"
certain important benefits from the decedent, regardless of the pro-
visions of the decedent's will. For example, a surviving non-em-
ployee spouse normally inherits the right to receive the monthly
Social Security benefits that were paid to the decedent.88 In addi-
tion, the survivor normally will receive a survivor's annuity from
the employee's pension plan.89 In contrast, a divorcing non-em-
ployee spouse normally will receive none of the other spouse's So-
cial Security benefits,90 and only a fraction of his/her pension.91
86. Id. at 104, 111-12.
87. See 1984 ADVANCE REPORT, supra note 48.
88. See generally E. KINGSON, WHAT YOU MUST KNOW ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY
AND MEDICARE (1987).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 118-25.
90. The employee-spouse's Social Security benefits normally are not divided at divorce.
J.T. OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 12.02 [3]
(1987) [hereinafter DIVORCE AND DISTRIBUTION]. However, the non-employee divorced
spouse might qualify for her own benefits, if the marriage lasted for 10 years. See E. KING-
SON, supra note 88.
91. See generally DIVORCE AND DISTRIBUTION, supra note 90, § 7.10 at 7-41.
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This suggests that, as compared to divorcing spouses, there is less of
a need to provide additional support for a surviving spouse.
Some might argue that the right to post-death support should
depend upon the survivor's behavior during marriage. For exam-
ple, in some states a spouse's post-divorce alimony right can be to-
tally lost if the court concludes that the spouse's behavior during
marriage was offensive.92 Also, even if neither spouse is at "fault,"
if marriage discord had reached the point where the spouses chose
to divorce, a support obligation to a dependent spouse normally
would not survive the death of the payor. If there is marital dis-
cord, but the parties do not divorce, should this affect a right to
post-death support?
In those instances where a wealthy decedent does not leave the
surviving spouse an amount of property sufficient to provide sup-
port, this does suggest that there was significant marital discord. 93
Still, if the right to support is tied to the survivor's behavior during
marriage and the amount of marital discord, the probate process
could become as emotionally destructive as a divorce custody fight,
especially where children from a prior marriage contest the issue.
Also, this could complicate the probate process. Furthermore, in
connection with a divorce, many states will not award alimony to a
dependent spouse who committed acts that significantly contributed
to the "breakdown" of a marriage. However, when death dissolves
a marriage, at least in theory, the marriage remains intact.94 Be-
cause the marriage remained intact, no acts could have contributed
to its "breakdown." For all of these reasons, the survivor's behav-
ior during marriage therefore should not be a consideration when
determining a right to post-death support.
VI. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE RIGHTS OF A
SURVIVING SPOUSE
Under current law, all rights of a surviving spouse in a common
92. Id. § 13.04 at 13-39.
93. Available information suggests that this does not happen frequently, if the decedent
had sufficient property to provide for the survivor. See M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH,
supra note 34, at 103; Clark, supra note 12, at 514; Dunham, The Method, Process and Fre-
quency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241, 251-52 (1963) (only 8% of
wills studied in Cook County failed to leave the surviving spouse the entire estate); Browder,
Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the U.S. and England, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1303, 1311
(1969) ("Some evidence remains for the proposition that a small proportion of testators
would, if possible, leave their widows less than the [forced share].").
94. If the spouses had separated and were contemplating divorce, however, this issue
could be presented.
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law state, such as the right to probate homestead, family mainte-
nance and a forced share, can be waived in a marital contract.95 In
most states, the spouses must make a fair disclosure regarding their
assets, and duress in connection with the execution of the contract
must be absent.96 Still, under the majority rule there is no require-
ment that the contract be substantively fair, either at the time of
execution or at the time of death, so long as the surviving spouse
was aware of what he or she was getting into.97
It is curious that courts have been more willing to uphold waiv-
ers in contracts dealing with the rights of spouses at death than they
have been to uphold waivers dealing with their respective rights and
95. See, eg., Roberts v. Estate of Roberts, 664 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. App. 1984); In re Es-
tate of Peterson, 221 Neb. 792, 381 N.W.2d 109 (1986) (forced share); In re Estate of Meyers,
709 P.2d 1044 (Okla. 1985) (widow's homestead and probate allowance); MICH. COMP. L.
§ 700.291 (1979) (family allowance and homestead allowance). See generally Haskell, The
Premarital Estate Contract and Social Policy, 57 N.C. L. REv. 415, 424, 428-29 (1979) (com-
pares premarital agreements limiting spousal rights in death to those on divorce).
96. See Haskell, supra note 95, at 416; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L.
REv. 141 (1979); Annotation, Setting Aside Antenuptial Contract or Marriage Settlement on
Ground of Failure to Make Proper Disclosure of Property Owned, 27 A.L.R. 2D 883 (1953).
See, eg., Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978); In re Estate of Geyer, 14 Fam.
L. Rep. (BNA) 1029 (Pa. 1987); CAL. PROB. CODE § 143 (West Supp. 1987).
97. See Haskell, supra note 95, at 416, 418-19 ("Substantive fairness is never determina-
tive of validity" in most common law states---"disclosure alone determines validity."). See
e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962); Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324
N.W.2d 381 (Minn. 1982); Sunshine v. Sunshine, 51 A.D.2d 326, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 260 (1976);
Hook v. Hook, 69 Ohio St. 2d 234, 431 N.E.2d 667 (1982).
California will enforce an unfair contract if the surviving spouse was represented by coun-
sel when the contract was signed, and a disclosure of the property of the other spouse was
provided to the surviving spouse before signing (unless the surviving spouse waived the dis-
closure). See CAL. PROB. CODE § 143 (West Supp. 1987).
A few courts will enforce a waiver of rights only if the terms were fair at time of execu-
tion. See Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 389 N.E.2d 385 (1979) (The court held that
fraud was needed to invalidate the antenuptial agreement, but said that in future cases it
would look at other factors, including whether the agreement was fair at the time of execu-
tion.); In re Estate of Benker, 416 Mich. 681, 331 N.W.2d 193 (1982) (The court held an
antenuptial agreement to be invalid because the presumption of non-disclosure of assets was
not rebutted.); Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. App. 1980) (The court looked at the
fairness of an antenuptial agreement as of the date of the agreement in holding it invalid).
Others would not enforce a waiver if it was unconscionable at the time of signing. See Estate
of Lebsock, 44 Colo. App. 220, 618 P.2d 683 (1980) (The court upheld an antenuptial agree-
ment where the widow had waived all claims against her husband's estate, stating that an
agreement is unenforceable if it is unconscionable at the time it was entered into.); Martin v.
Farber, 68 Md. App. 137, 510 A.2d 608 (1986), cert. denied, 308 Md. 237, 517 A.2d 1126
(1986) (The court stated that the validity of an antenuptial agreement is determined as of the
time entered into, while holding this particular agreement to be not unconscionable). See also
UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 10(f)(1), 9A U.L.A. 120 (1983). These authorities look to the
fairness at the time of signing, not at the time of death. Cf. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 143-44
(west Supp. 1987) (provision focuses on the waiver's fairness at the time of signing in deter-
mining enforceability).
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obligations at divorce. For example, in connection with agreements
contemplating divorce, most states now grant spouses great free-
dom to change their respective rights in property accumulated dur-
ing marriage. 9 Still, significant disagreement remains regarding
whether a spouse can effectively waive a right to post-divorce ali-
mony. 99 So, it has not been accepted that a spouse can enforce a
waiver of a post-divorce support obligation, particularly if the waiv-
ing spouse would be left in great financial need.
This willingness to allow a waiver of a post-death support obli-
gation, but not a post-divorce obligation, is strange. When a mar-
riage is dissolved by death, it is probably more likely that the
marriage was a lifetime partnership. Also, if the marriage is dis-
solved by death it is more likely that the surviving spouse is a senior
citizen with significant financial needs. There presumably is a pub-
lie policy interest in facilitating adequate support for dependent
widows. Therefore, it would seem that the post-death support obli-
gation should be harder to waive than a post-divorce obligation. In
those states that do not allow waiver of the right to receive alimony,
it would seem logical not to allow the waiver of the right to receive
family maintenance after the death of a decedent."°°
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The forced share system attempts to accomplish two different
goals: the support function and the marital sharing function. It
accomplishes neither goal very well. The one system should be re-
placed by two different systems so that both goals of the forced
share system could be better served.
A. Marital Partnership Function
The forced share system should be modified to reflect the con-
98. See Oldham, Premarital Contracts Are Now Enforceable, Unless.... 21 Hous. L.
REv. 757, 758-59 (1984) [hereinafter Premarital Contracts].
99. Id. at 761 n.17.
100. Few states are in accord with this proposition. For example, a waiver of post-di-
vorce support contained in a premarital contract is unenforceable in California. See In re
Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976) (The court held
that an antenuptial agreement was enforceable where the husband and wife agreed to hold
their earnings during marriage as separate property, because its terms did not promote disso-
lution). However, a probate homestead and the family allowance can be waived. See CAL.
PROB. CODE § 145 (West Supp. 1987). These waivers will not be enforced if the surviving
spouse was not represented by counsel when the contract was signed and the terms of the
contract are unconscionable, in light of the circumstances of the surviving spouse when the
first spouse dies. See id. at §§ 143-44.
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cept of marital partnership. Alternatively, the forced share system
could be replaced by the Uniform Marital Property Act concept of
shared ownership during marriage. 0 1 Some commentators seem
concerned that this latter alternative would complicate manage-
ment of property by the spouses during marriage. 102 In contrast, if
the marital partnership concept is incorporated into the forced
share system, management during marriage would not be affected,
but the surviving spouse would receive a share of the property accu-
mulated during marriage, at least if the dependent spouse survived
the wage-earner.
The marital partnership concept could be incorporated into the
forced share system by redefining the estate upon which the survi-
vor could elect a forced share. The forced share should be limited
to the acquisitions of the decedent during marriage, other than gra-
tuitous transfers from third parties.103 Provisions similar to the
Uniform Probate Code's augmented estate could be incorporated so
the decedent could not circumvent the survivor's forced share with
inter vivos transfers or will substitutes."m Based upon the partner-
ship model, the survivor always should be able to elect to receive
one-half of this marital property estate, instead of the one-third
share that is now common. Offset against this forced share should
be one-half of all property held by the survivor at the time of the
decedent's death, to the extent that the property was acquired dur-
ing marriage, but not due to a gratuitous transfer. 10 In addition, it
probably would be fair to offset gifts made by the decedent to the
surviving spouse during marriage, as well as any bequests by the
decedent to the survivor.
The determination of what constitutes property subject to a
forced share certainly should not be difficult in those states that per-
101. Some commentators have advocated this. See Kulzer, Law and the Housewife
Property, Divorce and Death, supra note 7; Power, Well Begun Is Half Done" Community
Property For Missouri, 21 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 308 (1977) (recognizing that marriage is a part-
nership means it should be treated as such upon its termination); Volkmer, supra note 13, at
123.
102. See Rheinstein, Book Review, 59 MICH. L. REv. 806 (1961).
103. See, eg., OKLA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 44 (West Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-2-201, 75-2-202 (1978).
104. CAL. PROB. CODE § 102 (West Supp. 1987).
105. This would make the system much like a community property system. In such a
system, the first spouse to die can devise 50% of the fruits of the marriage and the survivor
retains the other 50%. See generally W. REPPY & C. SAMUEL, supra note 6, at 309 (cases
and materials involving dissolution of the community property marriage by death). The com-
munity assets generally include all accumulations by either spouse during marriage, except
for property acquired by gift or inheritance. Id. at 9. In community property states, each
spouse has a 50% interest in each item of community property. Id. at 314.
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mit a divorce court to divide only property accumulated during
marriage, other than gifts or inheritances. 106 In those states, the
property included in the decedent's estate for purposes of the forced
share could be made equivalent to such "marital property" divisible
at divorce. This proposed system would be similar to the system
applied in California to determine the surviving spouse's share of
property accumulated by the decedent while domiciled in a com-
mon law state, if the decedent then moved to California. 107
B. The Support Function
In some instances, 50 percent of the assets of the marital part-
nership will not be sufficient to provide for the surviving spouse.
This squarely presents the issue of the circumstances, if any, in
which the decedent should have an obligation to support the survi-
vor. Many states now provide a family allowance for a surviving
spouse while the estate is being administered.'10 However, these
systems seem quite inadequate to satisfy this function if the spouse
is dependent, because under current systems support for the survi-
vor normally ceases one year after the death of the decedent.10 9 The
average duration of widowhood is about eight years for men, and
about fifteen years for women." 0
It is not clear whether all decedents should have a continuing
obligation to support a surviving spouse. American divorce law
certainly does not make this assumption. Alimony awards gener-
ally cease upon the payor's death, regardless of the recipient's
need."' Many Commonwealth countries do impose such a support
obligation upon a decedent's estate, but the divorce rate in those
countries is significantly lower than the U.S. rate." 2 In such coun-
tries it may be fair to impose a post-death support obligation.
When imposing a post-death duty of support, it would make
sense to distinguish between the different types of American mar-
riages. For example, some marriages last for a long period, and
involve the raising of children, while others are short and do not
involve the assumption of childcare responsibilities. I have argued
106. For a survey of these states, see DIVORCE AND DISMIBUTION, supra note 90,
§ 13.03[7], n.46.
107. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 101-02 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West
Supp. 1987).
108. See, eg., TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 286 (Vernon 1980).
109. Id. at § 287. See supra note 15.
110. See Marriage and Divorce, supra note 51, at 112.
111. H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 461. Cf supra note 74.
112. See Spanier & Glick, supra note 48, at 329.
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above1 3 and elsewhere 14 that there are substantial differences be-
tween these two types of marriages that significantly affect the equi-
ties of imposing a support obligation that survives dissolution. If a
long-term post-death support obligation is to be imposed, I would
suggest limiting such support responsibilities to marriages of long
duration in which the spouses raised children.
The support obligation could be satisfied in a number of ways.
For example, the Commonwealth family maintenance system could
be accepted. 1 This would permit a probate court to render a rea-
sonable support award for a dependent survivor. If such a family
maintenance system would be adopted, it would be fair to limit the
support claim to the marital property portion of the decedent's es-
tate. Property acquired before marriage or after marriage by gift or
inheritance should be excluded. This system would essentially es-
tablish an equitable distribution procedure for division of the mari-
tal property owned by the decedent, if the marriage was a lifetime
partnership marriage.
This family maintenance system would have certain disadvan-
tages, however. Significant litigation could evolve regarding what
constitutes a "dependent" spouse, and what constitutes "reason-
able" support. Probate administration of many estates could be-
come more complicated. The estate reserve needed to provide
lifetime support for the surviving spouse could make it unclear
whether any devises to third parties could be completed. Also, the
support obligation could significantly disrupt the decedent's testa-
mentary intentions, and creditors' rights could be jeopardized.
When deciding whether to enact a system that would provide
support to a surviving spouse, it would be useful to attempt to de-
termine how many surviving spouses need such support, as well as
whether creating a survivor's support right would help many such
surviving spouses. Unfortunately, there is little information avail-
able. 116 However, an attempt can be made to estimate the magni-
113. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
114. See Oldham, supra note 40, at 281-86. Similar arguments have been made by others.
See, e.g., supra note 71.
115. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.35 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987). See generally R.
OUGHTON, supra note 36.
116. One recent study found that if a spouse died when the surviving widow was younger
than 50, there was no significant decline in the standard of living for the widow. See Morgan,
Economic Changes at Midlife Widowhood: A Longitudinal Analysis, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
899 (1981). Another study found that older widows are more likely to experience a decline in
standard of living, particularly if the widow had little work experience outside the home. See
Smith & Zick, supra note 56, at 619. See also, Income Transitions, supra note 56, at 292.
The Bureau of the Census has found that, for women of the same age, a divorced woman
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tude of the problem.
Many spouses leave all of their property to the surviving
spouse. 1 1 7 Also, some spouses accumulate little or no property. In
these cases, the imposition of a post-death support responsibility
would not help the survivor. The support responsibility would only
be significant if the decedent accumulated a significant amount of
property and wanted to devise the property to someone else.
If the decedent leaves nothing to the surviving spouse, the sur-
viving spouse will receive Social Security benefits, if the spouses
qualified for such benefits. Under federal law, the surviving spouse
"inherits" the employee spouse's Social Security rights when he or
she dies, if the survivor is at least 65 years of age.' 8
Today most senior citizens are entitled to Social Security bene-
fits. For example, in 1979 approximately 92.5% of all persons aged
65 or older were receiving Social Security benefits. n 9
These Social Security rights can be quite valuable. The amount
of the benefits depends upon the age at which the employee retired,
the salary of the employee, and the amount of time the employee
contributed to Social Security. For example, for a 65 year-old
worker who retires in 1987, the maximum monthly retirement bene-
fit is $769.120 iThis amount will be adjusted annually to compensate
is more likely to have an income below the poverty level, as compared to widows. For exam-
ple, using 1979 information it was found that, for women aged 65-74, 22.1% of widows had
income below the poverty level, compared to 24.8% of divorced women. This information
was provided to the author by Arnold A. Goldstein of the Bureau of the Census.
One report has estimated that, of the 5.9 million widows, 19%, or 1.1 million, live in
poverty. See Old, Alone and Poor, supra note 56, at 3.
117. See C. SHAMMAS, M. SALMON & M. BAHLIN, INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 184-85, 196, 199 (1987); Browder, supra note 93, at 1307
(most decedents leave all their property to their spouses); Clark, supra note 12, at 514; Dun-
ham, supra note 93, at 251-52 (same as above); Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death,
50 WASH. L. REv. 277 (1975).
118. If the survivor is at least age 65, the survivor receives the employee's benefit amount.
If the survivor is younger than 65, but at least 60, the survivor receives a somewhat lower
benefit. See generally 20 C.F.RL §§ 404.335, 404.338 (1987) (specifying who is entitled to
widow's or widower's benefits, as well as the amounts thereof).
In 1988, the average benefits to a surviving widow will be $468 per month. See Spears,
U.S. Gives Recipients of Social Security 4.2 Percent Increase, Houston Chronicle, Oct. 24,
1987, at 8, col. 1.
119. See A. HACKER, A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 186 (1983).
120. See T. WATERBURY, MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND ESTATES 2 (1986). In 1988, the
maximum monthly retirement benefit will be $822 per month. See Spears, supra note 118, at
8, col. 1. The average monthly social security benefit for a worker will be $513 per month in
1988. Id. The method of computation is found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.201-404.290 (1987), and
is explained in T. WATERBURY, supra, at 2-7. Of course, all senior citizens do not receive the
maximum benefit. In 1983, the average monthly benefit for widows, widowers, and the
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for inflation. If, however, the employee continues working past age
65, than the amount received will be greater than if he or she had
retired at age 65.12 Furthermore, Social Security benefits are not
subject to federal income tax, unless the recipient has other in-
come. 22 The value of this survivor's Social Security benefit fre-
quently exceeds the value of all other property in the decedent's
estate. 123 For example, it would have cost approximately $60,000
in 1981 to buy a $500 monthly annuity for a seventy year-old
woman. 124
In the past, widows did not frequently receive pension benefits.
A number of factors caused this result. Married women rarely
worked outside the home for a continuous period long enough to
qualify for pension benefits in their own right. If the husband quali-
fied for a pension, the benefits were frequently paid as a single-life
annuity. Because men normally marry younger women, and be-
cause women normally live longer than men, this meant that many
widows did not receive pension benefits after their husband died.
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984125 establishes more rights
for a surviving non-employee spouse. This law specifies that all cov-
ered pensions must be paid as "joint and survivor" benefits, unless
the non-employee spouse approves a single life annuity payment
method.1 26 So, if the decedent earned pension rights, the surviving
spouse normally will receive both Social Security and the survivor's
pension benefits until she dies, regardless of the terms of the dece-
dent's will. 127 This will significantly increase the income of widows
nondisabled was $396. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 364 (105th ed.
1985) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
121. See T. WATERBURY, supra note 120, at 4.
122. Id. at 3.
123. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text, about the average value of estates.
124. See T. WATERBURY, supra note 120, at 1 n.4.
125. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.
126. Id at § 103, 98 Stat. 1429 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1055). Various joint and survivor
options are available. Most plans allow the employee to choose whether the survivor should
receive 50, 67 or 100% of the monthly pension payment received while both spouses are
living. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN
MEDIUM AND LARGE FIRMS, at 15 (1984) [hereinafter BLS EMPLOYEE BENEFITS STUDY].
The amount of monthly pension payment received while both spouses are alive is affected by
the survivor option selected.
127. See, e.g., Donohue v. Shell Provident Fund, 656 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
Some defined benefit pensions offset Social Security benefits against pension benefit rights.
See BLS EMPLOYEE BENEFITS STUDY, supra note 126, at 11. See also Bell & Hill, How
Social Security Payments Affect Private Pensions, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1984, at 55.
However, the 1986 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code specify that the pension bene-
fit cannot be reduced more than 50% due to this offset.
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whose husbands earned pension rights.12 An increasing number of
workers do earn pension rights.129
Another factor should gradually increase the financial well-be-
ing of widows. Married women are working outside the home in
increasing numbers. Also, the 1986 tax reform legislation mandates
that pension rights must fully vest after seven years of employ-
ment.1 30 Permitted break in service rules have been liberalized. Be-
cause of these changes, more women should independently qualify
for a pension from their own career.
The preceding discussion suggests that there may be a simpler
way to provide for surviving spouses who need support. If a family
maintenance system were adopted, the probate of all estates where
there is a surviving spouse would be made more complex. Also, the
testator would have no certainty that his devises to others would be
effective. A family maintenance system therefore would impose a
significant burden on many estates.
It would be desirable to create a maintenance system that would
impose less of a burden upon the testamentary freedom of the dece-
dent and the administration of estates. One such system is the life
estate probate homestead scheme adopted by Texas.1 31 The surviv-
ing spouse receives a life estate in the spouses' house at the time the
decedent died, regardless of the value of (or equity in) the house, up
to one acre of land in an urban area, or a larger area in a rural
area.' 32 Such a system attempts to provide at least a home for the
128. See Myers, Burkhauser & Holden, The Transition from Wife to Widow: The Impor-
tance of Survivor Benefits to Widows, 54 J. OF RISK & INS. 752 (1987).
129. Eighty-two percent of all full-time employees in medium and large firms are covered
by pension plans. (A firm must employ at least one hundred people to be considered such a
firm.) See BLS EMPLOYEE BENFITS STUDY, supra note 126, at 10. Eighty-three percent of
professional and administrative employees have such rights, as compared to 84% of technical
and clerical employees, and 80% of all production employees. Id. at 18.
If employer profit-sharing, thrift, and other similar defined contribution plans are in-
cluded, it has been estimated that more than 90% of workers in medium and large firms are
covered by some kind of pension plan (Statement made to the author by John Thompson of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
If all workers are included, not just employees of medium and large firms, the percentage
of covered workers is lower. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 120, at 368.
130. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 1113, 100 Stat. 2085, 2446-2448 (1986)
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a)(2)).
131. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52. Several other states appear to have a similar sys-
tem. See In re Finch's Estate, 401 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1981); Bacus v. Bums, 149 P. 1115
(Okla. 1915); IOWA CODE § 561.11 (1950); MINN. STAT. § 525.145 (1975 & Supp. 1988);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 311 (1965).
132. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52.
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spouse. The surviving spouse takes the homestead free of all debts
of the decedent, except for purchase money liens on the house.
In the past, a life estate has not been an effective support system
for a dependent surviving spouse, since the surviving spouse might
not be able to pay the house payment. Now, with improved Social
Security and survivor's pension benefits, more spouses will be able
to afford such expenses.1 33
Given the recent increases in Social Security benefits for a sur-
viving spouse and the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, it appears
that the most valuable family assets usually will be payable to a
surviving dependent spouse, regardless of the terms of the dece-
dent's will. The Social Security and pension rights often will be
worth more than the decedent's estate. If these benefits cannot sat-
isfy the survivor's support needs, it seems doubtful that funds from
the decedent's estate would often make a significant difference. So,
in the United States a family maintenance system would provide
few benefits and impose substantial costs. The probate homestead
system described above would help to ensure support for a surviv-
ing spouse, but would infringe much less on testamentary freedom
and impose much less of a burden on probate administration.
This probate homestead system may not provide adequate sup-
port for some spouses with unusual financial needs. Still, it would
not impose an additional burden upon the administration of estates.
Also, the decedent could be certain that most devises to third par-
ties would be effective. The cost of an individualized long-term sup-
port system from the decedent's estate (the family maintenance
system) would not be worth its minor benefits.
Some spouses may not own a house.' 34 These spouses probably
would not have significant assets in any event, however, so no fam-
ily maintenance system would be effective in such instances. In any
event an allowance in lieu of probate homestead could be created
for such situations. 35
The life estate probate homestead should be modified in one
way, however. In most states, all surviving spouses are given some
133. In 1980, one study found that, of those older couples who owned a home, 80%
owned the house "free and clear"; no mortgage debt remained. See UNITED STATES SENATE
SPECIAL CoMMITrEE ON AGING, Developments in Aging: 1985, vol. 3, at 50.
134. One recent study found that nearly 75% of older people owned a home. Id. A
significant number of these elderly people own their home "free and clear." UNITED STATES
SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, supra note 133, vol. 3, at 50. See also Chevan,
Homeownership in the Older Population 1940-1980, 9 RESEARCH ON AGING 226 (1987).
135. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 273, 277 (Vernon 1980).
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kind of a probate homestead. Probate homesteads should be limited
to those surviving spouses who need it,'36 and probably should only
arise after a marriage of long duration.
C. Contractual Waiver
Another issue worthy of continuing review is the spouses' ability
to contract out of the forced share and/or support right. Under the
Commonwealth system, the spouses cannot waive the surviving
spouse's support right.1 37 In contrast, American states now permit
spouses to waive forced share rights if the agreement is signed after
full disclosure and without duress.1 38 Also, most states permit
spouses to waive homestead rights and the family allowance.' 39
American spouses have significant power to alter the financial
ramifications of divorce, if the premarital agreement was signed af-
ter full disclosure and without duress."4 Still, not all states enforce
an alimony waiver. 14 1
If it is determined that, after a long marriage, a spouse should
have a support obligation (or a homestead right) that continues be-
yond death, it would be possible to establish a compromise position
regarding the validity of a waiver of rights by the surviving spouse.
The forced share could be considered waivable in a premarital con-
tract by a spouse, but the support obligation after a long marriage
could be considered not waivable. 42 This scheme would give most
spouses great contractual freedom, but some provision would be
made for a dependent spouse after a long marriage.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The rights given surviving spouses in community property states
generally reflect a sensible system. The surviving spouse receives
136. See, e-g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6523 (West Supp. 1987).
137. See R. OuGHTON, supra note 36, passim.
138. See, eg., Hoffman v. Kohns, 385 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Merrill v.
Estate of Merrill, 275 Or. 653, 552 P.2d 249 (1976). See also supra note 95.
139. See, ag., Hunter v. Clark, 687 S.W.2d 811, 815-17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing
waiver of homestead right in Texas); Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978) (dis-
cussing the enforceability of the waiver of homestead rights in states other than Texas).
140. See Premarital Contracts, supra note 98, at 763-64.
141. Id. at 761 n.17.
142. A similar approach was advocated in the Model Probate Code of 1946. See MODEL
PROB. CODE § 39 (Simes ed. 1946); Fratcher, supra note 7, at 1064 n. 109 and accompanying
text. The First Tentative Draft of Revised Part II of the Model Probate Code accepted much
broader waiver rules. Id. at 1064 n.110.
It may also be appropriate not to enforce a waiver if the circumstances of the parties have
materially changed since the waiver. See Premarital Contracts, supra note 98, at 774-82.
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fifty per cent of all property accumulated by the spouses during the
marriage, except for property acquired by gratuitous transfer. Also,
the spouse receives the furnishings of the spouses' home and transi-
tional support from the decedent's estate. In Texas, the spouse also
receives a life estate in the home.
The only questionable aspect of some state community property
systems is the grant of a probate homestead to all surviving spouses.
This assumes that all surviving spouses should have a long-term
right of support from the decedent. I would only give a probate
homestead to a needy spouse who survives a lifetime partnership
marriage.
Plucknett has described the law of inheritance as "an attempt to
describe the family in terms of property."14 3 The common law
forced share system no longer reflects a sense of the family that is
consistent with contemporary notions of marriage. Radical revision
is needed. The survivor should have no forced share right regarding
acquisitions by the decedent before marriage or gratuitous transfers
to the decedent during marriage. The forced share should be fifty
per cent, not one-third. With these changes, the common law sys-
tem would more closely resemble the community property scheme,
and would be more congruent with the current view of the nature of
marriage.
143. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 711 (5th ed. 1956).
Editor's Note: Subsequent to the printing of this Article, the author learned that the Editorial
Board of the Uniform Probate Code was considering whether to revise the Uniform Probate
Code provisions regarding the surviving spouse's forced share. In addition, two members of
the Editorial Board have recently published suggested amendments to the UPC forced share
system which are different from the author's proposal set out above. See Langbein & Wag-
goner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303 (1987).
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